Murray v. Schlosser (1990) (berate the brides)

a.       Facts- D’s were radio show hosts who hosted a segment called “Berate the Brides” in which they bad-mouthed publicly-found bride pictures and picked out a “dog of the week”. D’s picked P’s picture as “dog of the week” and maliciously insulted her. P brought suit of outrage against D for the incident.

b.      Procedural History-

c.       Issue- Whether P can bring suit of outrage against D for publicly making fun of her

d.      Holding-

e.       Rule-

f.       Rationale-

g.      Notes

Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp (1986)

a.       Facts- D, a steel company, was not happy with P’s work, a union rep. D hired a private investigator to place him under surveillance. The investigator found evidence that P was cheating on his wife, and sent same to P’s wife. The investigator also found P’s mug shots and publicized same. P sued D for outrage tort

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct gave summary judgment for D, Ct of appeals affirmed

c.       Issue- Whether P can bring outrage action against D for releasing mug shot pictures and exposing extramarital affair

d.      Holding- No, P cannot bring outrage action against D for releasing mug shot pictures and exposing extramarital affair

e.       Rule- Besides the conduct itself, the Ct must also consider the “personality of the individual to whom the misconduct is directed”

                                                              i.      The damages P presented were not enough to satisfy the “distress/damages” element

f.       Rationale- The P was considered to be a “rough-and-tumble” personality, therefore we must consider this info. There is nothing wrong with publicizing mug shots or exposing an extramarital affair. Further, P did not show any distress (damage), which is the 4^th elemental requirement of outrage tort

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      “Truth” as a defense:

1.      Public figures/officials HAVE to have “thick skin”

2.      “Actual malice” must be established

3.      Being cast into a public figure position…does NOT make you a public official

Muratore v. M/S Scotia Prince (1988) (gorilla pictures on cruise)

a.       Facts- P was a passenger on a cruise ship. D’s employees were taking pictures of people boarding the ship. P expressly stated that she did not want to be pictured; D did so anyway. Throughout the cruise, D kept picturing P and being rude to her. As a result, P stayed in her room for several hours during the trip. P sued D for outrage.

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct found judgment for P. Ct of appeals affirmed

c.       Issue- Whether taking pictures and making obscene remarks at someone constitutes the “outrageous” element of an outrage action, in the context given

d.      Holding- Yes, in the given context, taking pictures and making obscene remarks satisfies the “outrage” element of an outrage action

e.       Rule- Intent is satisfied if you tell the D you do not want a particular action, but D does it anyway. “Outrageous” element of outrage may also be satisfied if P tells D they do not want a certain action, but D does it anyway

f.       Rationale- P expressly said that she did not want to be photographed, and even attempted to evade the picturing. “The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor’s knowledge that the other is particularly susceptible to emotional distress”

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      P told D not to do it, and when D did it, P again told D to stop. If you know someone doesn’t want something, but you do it anyway, this may satisfy the “outrageous” conduct element required by an outrage tort

Greer v. Medders (1985)

a.       Facts- P went in for surgery, but his original surgeon was on vacation. D was sent in place for the original surgeon. When D did not visit P for several days, he called D’s office. D came to the hospital and bad-mouthed P and his wife. This bad-mouthing caused P to experience uncontrollable psychotic shaking, and his wife to start crying. P bought suit of outrage against D.

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct gave summary judgment to D, Ct of appeals reversed.

c.       Issue- Whether P can bring action of outrage against D for insults, etc. (D is P’s doctor)

d.      Holding- Yes, P can bring outrage action against D for insults

e.       Rule- When determining “outrageous” element of outrage tort, we must consider the parties’ relationship.

f.       Rationale- Because D was P’s doctor, a “power relationship” existed. The insults that transpire in the context of a “power relationship” must be viewed differently than a random stranger off the streets

g.      Notes-

                                                              i.      At the time, D was actually the P’s doctor (power relationship). Damages were actually found

Roberts v. Saylor (1981)

a.       Facts- P underwent 3 surgeries. First surgeon left some sutures in P. Second surgeon, D, removed the sutures. P sued the first surgeon and asked for D’s testimony to help him. D refused, noting “people like P are thieves”. As P went in for a third unrelated surgery, P saw D, although not his surgeon. D then said “I don’t like you, I don’t like you”. P sued D for outrage

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct held for D, Kansa Sup Ct agreed.

c.       Issue- Whether P can bring an outrage action against D for insults (D is NOT P’s doctor)

d.      Holding- No, P cannot bring an outrage action against D for mere insult, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities.

e.       Rule- Mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty expressions, or other trivialities cannot be the basis of outrage claims.

f.       Rationale- People are expected to become “hardened” to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and their feelings being hurt.

                                                              i.      People should have the freedom to express “unflattering opinion” and “blow off relatively harmless steam”

g.      Notes- “Power relationship”…much like the outrageous boss, had the P’s actual surgeon said it, it would have been a different

                                                              i.      You don’t need to prove your “distress” medically…sucks for D

                                                            ii.      No damages were found in this case…damages MUST be present to claim outrage

Newell v. Whitcher (1880)

a.       Facts- P, blind music teacher for D, was sleeping overnight in D’s house. D entered the room P was sleeping in, and “made repeated and persistent solicitations to her for sexual intimacy, which she repelled”. P sued D to recover for the sickness and fright she claimed to have suffered as a result.

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct entered judgment on jury verdict for P. D appealed

c.       Issue- Whether D’s actions constituted assault

d.      Holding- Yes, D’s actions did constitute assault

e.       Rule- All necessary requisites of assault were present: intent and action

f.       Rationale- D had the intent to offend P, and P had an apprehension of imminent offense

Tuberville v. Savage (1669)

a.       Facts- P sued D for battery. D countered by claiming P assaulted D by putting his hand on his sword and saying “If the courts were not it session, I would not take such language from you”.

b.      Procedural History- P was entitled to judgment

c.       Issue- Whether the P’s statement and action can constitute assault

d.      Holding- No, P’s statement and action could not constitute assault

e.       Rule- Need both intent and act to constitute assault

f.       Rationale- P did not put apprehension of imminent danger in D

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      Words can negate a potential assault…AND words can also help show an assault

Langford v. Shu (1962)

a.       Facts- D wanted to play a trick on P. A “jack-in-the-box” type prank was executed by her son. P was scared by the prank, and stumbled into a brick wall, tearing cartilage in her knee. P sued for assault

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct gave D judgment as a matter of law. N.C Sup Ct reversed

c.       Issue- Whether D is liable for assault, even though she did not execute the prank

d.      Holding- Yes, D is liable for assault, even though she did not execute the prank

e.       Rule- An actor may be liable for assault if they aided and abetted the assault

f.       Rationale- By playing along with the joke, D was aiding and abetting

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      Even if she didn’t doing the springing, she had knowledge of it and took part in it

Bennight v. Western Auto Supply Co. (1984)

a.       Facts- P worked for D. D told/made P work in the back, where it was known that an infestation of bats were located. P was bitten by a bat and required anti-rabies treatment, which left her blind. P filed suit for loss of consortium because of assault

b.      Procedural History- Special verdict found for P, trial Ct entered a judgment that P take nothing. Ct of appeals reversed.

c.       Issue- Whether intention of outcome is required to claim assault

d.      Holding- No, intention of outcome is not necessary to claim assault

e.       Rule- Intention of additional and subsequent harm from an assault is NOT necessary to claim assault

f.       Rationale- Intentionally placing the P in fear of being attacks by the bats was an “assault”

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      Egg-shell Skull: Take the plaintiff as they are…what they tell you, you must follow

                                                            ii.      Consent- When you are dealing with a job…sometimes you don’t have a choice. It’s a different type of power that the employer asserts over the employee

                                                          iii.      Intent doesn’t require to intend actual harm…only the apprehension of actual harm or offense

Brower v. Ackerley (1997)

a.       Facts- D erected billboards that P did not like. P successfully convinced the city to remove said billboards. D then started threatening P’s life via telephone. P then sued for assault

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct gave D summary judgment on the assault claim. Ct of appeals affirmed in regards to the assault claim

c.       Issue- Whether telephone threats constitute the requisite element for assault

d.      Holding- No, telephone threats do not constitute the requisite element for assault

e.       Rule- An imminent threat is an element of assault that must be satisfied to claim assault

f.       Rationale- While a threat over telephone can be considered a threat, it does not put apprehension of imminent, dangerous contact. But rather, a delayed harmful or offensive contact

g.      Notes- Why must the threat be imminent?

                                                              i.      Because the harm is most likely to occur if the threat is imminent

                                                            ii.      Downside of imminence: You can have a HUGE, REAL threat…but if it’s not imminent, you can’t bring suit for assault

Assault

1.      ʃ 21. Assault

a.       Actor is subject to liability to another for assault if:

                                                              i.      Actor intends harmful or offensive contact w/ another, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, AND

                                                            ii.      The other is put in such imminent apprehension

b.      An action which is not done with the intention stated in Subsection (a) does not make the actor liable, even if the act causes an apprehension

c.       Assault is made to protect people’s personal integrity

2.      ʃ 22. Attempt Unknown to Other

a.       Apprehension must be present for assault. If the attempt of the act is unknown to other, no assault exists.

3.      ʃ 24. What Constitutes Apprehension

a.       Fear is not a requisite for assault. Knowledge of imminent harm or offense is the requisite

4.      ʃ 28. Apprehension of Unintended Bodily Contact

a.       If the actor only intends apprehension of bodily contact, and not actual harmful or offensive contact, then the actor is still liable for assault

5.      ʃ Character of Intent Necessary

a.       ex. As C points a gun at B and threatens to shoot, A comes into the line of fire. A apprehends imminent danger. C is liable to A and B for assault

CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc. (1997) (using servers for spam)

a.       Facts- P is an internet provider and D is an internet marketing agency. D uses P’s systems to send unsolicited “spam” email. P claims that, by doing so, it negatively affects P’s systems. P told D to stop; D did not stop. P sued D for trespass to chattel.

b.      Procedural History- Ct granted the request for a preliminary injunction, finding that P was likely to succeed on the merits.

c.       Issue- Whether email/system use is an actionable subject matter for trespass to chattel

d.      Holding- Yes, emails/system use can be the subject matter for actions of trespass to chattel

e.       Rule- Physical dispossession is not necessary for a suit of trespass to chattel, so long as damage is present

f.       Rationale- Physical damage is not necessary for a suit of trespass to chattel. By using P’s computer systems, D devalued (damaged) the system.

Kremen v. Cohen (2003)

This summary is not available. Please click here to view the post.

Moore v. Regents of the University of California (1990)

a.       Facts- P underwent surgery in which Ds removed his spleen. Without P’s knowledge, D conducted research on P’s cells from the spleen to develop a “cell line”, which Ds then obtained a patent on. Said cell line is worth 3bil dollars. P sued for conversion of his cells

b.      Procedural History- Trial Ct dismissed complaint. Ct of appeals reversed. California Sup Ct reversed Ct of appeals.

c.       Issue- Whether the P had ownership in the excised cells such that he may file suit for conversion.

d.      Holding- No, P cannot claim ownership to the excised cells for the purpose of filing conversion suit

e.       Rule- Under conversion theory, no action can be brought where the subject matter is cells excised during medical treatment. However, action may be brought under breach of fiduciary duty or informed-consent theories

f.       Rationale- “We should not threaten with disabling civil liability innocent parties who are engaged in socially useful activities”. Also, patients should have the right to make autonomous medical decisions.

Russell-Vaughn Ford, Inc. v. Rouse (1968)

a.       Facts- P (Rouse) went to a dealership to exchange his car and cash for a different car. D asked for P’s keys and P complied. After looking around the lot, P asked for his keys back; none of the employees of D knew where the keys were. D called the police. When the police came, a salesman tossed P the keys and said they were jokingly holding the keys. P filed suit for conversion.

b.      Procedural History- Jury brought a general verdict in P’s favor. Alabama Sup Ct affirmed.

c.       Issue- Whether an actor must appropriate the property to his own use to constitute conversion

d.      Holding- No, an actor does not necessarily need to appropriate the property to his own use to constitute conversion

e.       Rule- Refusal, without legal excuse to deliver a chattel, is what constitutes conversion

f.       Rationale- By exercising dominion over another’s chattel in exclusion or defiance of the right of the plaintiff, the actor is liable for conversion. Further, possessor does NOT need to exhaust all options for retrieving chattel after demanding its return; refusal to deliver chattel is what constitutes conversion.

g.      Notes

                                                              i.      P still OWNED the car throughout, not D

                                                            ii.      Why did he get the full price of his car AND the car back?

1.      Perhaps to make an example to deter consumer protection infractions