Van Alstyne v. Rochester Telephone Corp. (1937) (lead droppings)

a.       Facts- P owned 2 dogs. D sent an employee to work on a telephone line on P’s land; D had proper authority to be on the land for repairs. During a repair, D left molten lead droppings on the ground, which P’s dogs ate. Both dogs died because of ingesting the lead droppings.

b.      Procedural History- Judgment for P

c.       Issue- Whether leaving droppings of lead on another’s property after a telephone line repair constitutes trespass

d.      Holding- Yes, leaving lead droppings on another’s property after a repair constitutes trespass

e.       Rule- By depositing articles or substances on another’s land, the depositor is liable for trespass

f.       Rationale- D did not have an expressed right to leave articles or substances on P’s land, therefore, D is liable for trespass

g.      Notes-

                                                              i.      What would a reasonable person do?

1.      A reasonable person would have checked behind to make sure nothing else is left behind

Malouf v. Dallas Athletic Country Club (1992)

a.       Facts- P lived next to D’s golf course. P sued D for trespass for vehicle damage (on P’s land) that happened because golfers from D’s golf course

b.      Procedural History- D won judgment after bench trial, court of appeals affirmed

c.       Issue- Whether unintentional damage to P’s car constitutes trespass.

d.      Holding- No, unintentional damage to P’s car does not constitute trespass.

e.       Rule- An unintentionally act of “trespass” does not constitute trespass; a requisite for trespass is intent to enter property.

2.      ʃ 164. Intrusions Under Mistake

a.       Intentionally entering another’s land on a mistaken fact or law does not clear the actor from trespass liability

3.      ʃ 166. Non-Liability for Accidental Intrusions

a.       an actor is not liable for trespass if he entered the land accidently

                                                              i.      ex: A slips on a piece of ice which causes him to enter B’s land. A is not liable for trespass

Pegg v. Gray

a.       Facts- D and P had adjoining plots of land. P had cattle in his land while D kept hounds for the sport purpose of hunting foxes. During hunting season, D would let the hounds loose to chase the foxes. The hounds would go on to D’s land and disrupt the cattle, causing damage. P sued for trespass.

b.      Procedural History- Trial court dismissed trespass case, N.C. Supp Ct reversed

c.       Issue- Whether a person who intentionally lets their hounds loose on another’s property for the sport purpose of fox hunting can be liable for trespass.

                                                              i.      Whether a person who intentionally lets their dogs loose can be liable for trespass

d.      Holding- Yes, a person who knowingly lets loose their hounds on another’s property for the sport purpose of hunting can be liable for trespass.

e.       Rule- In absence of permission, an owner of dogs is liable for trespass if said dogs go on another’s property, even though the owner himself is not on the land.

f.       Rationale- You are responsible for the things you put on another’s land

Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1995)

a.       Facts- D’s sent employees undercover with concealed cameras to pose as patients seeking eye exams at P’s clinics. D then used the footage as part of a television show. P is suing for trespass, because had P known D’s motive, P wouldn’t have allowed entry.

b.      Procedural History- District court dismissed trespass counts in complaint, P appealed

c.       Issue- Whether entering the eye clinic on false pretenses constituted trespass.

d.      Holding- No, entering the eye clinic on false pretenses does not constitute trespass

e.       Rule- Entry upon another’s property under false pretenses does not constitute trespass until the property is affected

f.       Rationale- Trespass is meant to protect a person’s property. In this case, the clinic’s property was not adversely affected. Gaining entry through false pretenses might still constitute consent. If the property was to be affected, then consent would not be a defense to trespass.

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      ʃ 168. Conditional or Restricted Consent

1.      A conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or restriction is complied with.

                                                            ii.      ʃ 158. Liability for Intentional Intrusions on Land

1.      One is subject to liability for trespass if he intentionally:

a.       Enters the land of another or causes something else to enter the land, or

b.      Remains on the land, or

c.       Fails to remove something from the land that shouldn’t be there

2.      Comment i.- Actor may be liable for trespass for throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either on or beneath the surface of land or in the air space above it

Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1995)

a.       Facts- D’s sent employees undercover with concealed cameras to pose as patients seeking eye exams at P’s clinics. D then used the footage as part of a television show. P is suing for trespass, because had P known D’s motive, P wouldn’t have allowed entry.

b.      Procedural History- District court dismissed trespass counts in complaint, P appealed

c.       Issue- Whether entering the eye clinic on false pretenses constituted trespass.

d.      Holding- No, entering the eye clinic on false pretenses does not constitute trespass

e.       Rule- Entry upon another’s property under false pretenses does not constitute trespass until the property is affected

f.       Rationale- Trespass is meant to protect a person’s property. In this case, the clinic’s property was not adversely affected. Gaining entry through false pretenses might still constitute consent. If the property was to be affected, then consent would not be a defense to trespass.

g.      Notes:

                                                              i.      ʃ 168. Conditional or Restricted Consent

1.      A conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so only in so far as the condition or restriction is complied with.

                                                            ii.      ʃ 158. Liability for Intentional Intrusions on Land

1.      One is subject to liability for trespass if he intentionally:

a.       Enters the land of another or causes something else to enter the land, or

b.      Remains on the land, or

c.       Fails to remove something from the land that shouldn’t be there

2.      Comment i.- Actor may be liable for trespass for throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either on or beneath the surface of land or in the air space above it

Brzoska v. Olson

a.       D had HIV/AIDS and performed dental work for P. P is suing for battery…the result was NL:

                                                              i.      Offensive touching did not occur- Offensiveness of an act is measured by “reasonableness” standard. It’s reasonable to fear HIV/AIDS if the actor has open cuts, channel of fluid/infection. None of the P’s were exposed to any of those, therefore, their fear was unfounded.

                                                            ii.      P claims that they would have never consented to the procedures had they known D had HIV/AIDS. Courts rejected this theory on the basis that “a battery consists of a touching of a substantially different nature and character than that which the patient consented”. NL if the patient is touched the exact way he consented

                                                          iii.      Question: Can having HIV/AIDS make the “procedure” different? If it does, then Ps have not consented to this “new procedure”, namely the same procedure but performed by an HIV/AIDS infected doctor.

Grabowski v. Quigley

1.      Grabowski v. Quigley

a.       P consented to D to perform a back surgery. P later found that D did not perform the surgery, but rather D’s colleague performed it. P sued for battery.

b.      P was NOT in an emergency situation; AND P did NOT give consent to anyone to perform the surgery the way it happened. Therefore, D is liable for battery.

2.      ʃ 52. Consent: to whom given

a.       Comment b. There are many cases in which a patient gives consent to the hospital, rather than a specific doctor. This way, the hospital has been given consent for an agent of the hospital to perform the surgery.